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Generic Commodity Promotion and Product Differentiation
1.  Introduction
One justification for generic commodity programs is that agricultural products are,
essentially, homogeneous, and free-rider problems create little incentive for private promotion.
Generic promotion thus helps all growers when it causes demand to shift out.  However, during the
Supreme Court case of Wileman et al. (1997), attorneys for the grower/handlers argued that their
clients’ products were differentiated and that, although total demand increased with generic
advertising, some growers were affected differently than others.  Specifically, it was argued that
generic promotion reduced the differentiation among products. The idea that branded advertising
may increase product differentiation seems plausible.  After all, advertisements for a specific brand
are used to influence consumers’ preferences for different brands (e.g., “Sun Maid raisins are better
than other raisins”).  What is interesting, however, is whether generic advertising used to raise
demand for all brands may be sending a signal to consumers that any of the brands are worthy (e.g.,
“buy any California raisins since all California raisins are good”).
At stake are millions of dollars in assessment fees that go to pay for the generic advertising
programs.  For California marketing orders alone, assessments for promotion grew from $51 million
in 1985 to $84 million in 1992 (Lee et al., 1996).  Although many studies have examined the
effectiveness of generic programs to increase demand, relatively few have looked at the effects of
both branded and generic advertising on commodity demand.  Kaiser and Liu (1998) and Alston et
al. (1998) included both branded and generic advertising variables to determine the effects on
aggregate demands for dairy products and prunes, respectively.  However, while both studies show
that branded and generic promotion increase overall demand, neither looked at whether branded and
generic promotion affected individual firms in different ways.
A key claim of opponents of generic promotion programs is that these programs are inimical
to their own programs aimed at creating product differentiation.  Although such arguments were2
made in the Wileman et al. case, the effects of generic and branded advertising on product
differentiation have been ignored in the economic models that have estimated grower returns.  In
this study, I shall attempt to model the effect of generic advertising in a vertically differentiated,
spatial-competition game.   The goal will be to examine the veracity of growers' claims under
alternative sets of market conditions.
Drawing on recent literature from industrial organization, I shall examine product
differentiation and commodity promotion in the context of a multi-stage game where advertising
influences a product’s perceived quality.
1  The full game will incorporate growers' preferences for a
marketing order given the degree of differentiation in their product, processors' decisions as to
product quality and whether or not to self-promote, and consumers' preferences given retail prices,
the intrinsic quality of the processed good and the quantity of branded and generic promotion.  The
retail-level stage is modeled as a Bertrand game where competition is in prices.  If products are
differentiated, there will be market power in this context.
2.  The Model
Although altered slightly, the model chosen for this paper is based on a model developed by
Mussa and Rosen (1978), and shall be referred to below as the Mussa and Rosen model.  However,
this model differs from Mussa and Rosen-type models and other advertising models using spatial
analyses because it allows total demand to increase.  In this model, there is a continuum of
consumers whose types are identified by θ , the marginal willingness to pay for quality, which is
uniformly distributed over [0, l].  In this section, I let l = 1, but this simplification is relaxed in the
empirical section.  There are two integrated grower/handlers, firm 1 and firm 2, who compete in the
retail sector in a Bertrand fashion.  The two firms’ products are differentiated such that if both
products were offered at the same price, consumers would prefer to buy from firm 1.  In this static
                                                          
1 For this brief paper, the review of the literature on advertising as a signal of quality has been removed.  The reader
may contact the author for this section.3
game, the firms may not alter the intrinsic quality (e.g., the sugar content, color, texture) of their
goods, but they can augment consumers’ perceptions of their good’s quality through branded
advertising campaigns, generic promotion, or both.  As in Bonanno (1986), the idea here is that
consumers prefer to buy advertised products to unadvertised products (if prices are the same).  Each
good’s perceived quality level is denoted ki = ki(κ 0i, Bi, G), i=1, 2.  For simplicity, a good’s
perceived quality is not a function of a competing good’s advertising.  Perceived quality is divided
into two components: i) intrinsic quality, κ 0i, which could be thought of as some (constant) physical
characteristic such as the good's sugar content, and ii) quality that is influenced by advertising.  In
this static model, the intrinsic quality for good 1 is greater than that for good 2, perhaps because of
some previous competition in research and development or because firm 1 is established in a better
growing region.  Bi is firm i’s branded promotion and G denotes the level of generic advertising
spent in the industry – of which each producer pays a proportion.  Perceived quality is increasing in
each of its arguments.  In the analysis that follows, I shall avoid notational clutter by denoting the
perceived quality variables simply by k1 and k2, but the reader should keep in mind that they are
functions.
A consumer of type θ  chooses some composite good or bundle of goods outside of the
industry and one of the two goods mentioned above in order to maximize Ui(x, ki; θ ) = δ x + θ ki
subject to Pi(ki) + x ≤   y.  The first choice variable, x, is the composite good and prices and income
have been normalized by its price.  Only one unit of good i is purchased.  When consumers
purchase good i, they are choosing the good’s perceived quality, ki, with the price of the good being
a function of this quality: Pi = Pi(ki).  y is the consumer’s income, and it is assumed for simplicity
that all consumers have the same level of income.4
Specifying the Lagrangian function for the utility maximization problem as L = δ x + θ ki -
λ [Pi + x – y], and solving the first-order conditions for this maximization problem gives the indirect
utility of a consumer of type θ  buying variant i:
(1) Vi(Pi, ki, y,θ ,) = λ [y – Pi] + θ ki  ,   i = 1, 2.
By the first-order conditions, δ  is equal to λ , and setting δ  = λ  = 1 simplifies equation (1):
(1’) Vi(Pi, ki, y,θ ,) = y – Pi + θ ki 
 In the empirical section, this simplification will not be used.  The reader may verify that since δ  is a
constant, setting it to unity does not change what follows.
In the industry in question, firm i = 1, 2 faces demand Qi = Qi(Pi, Pj, ki, kj).  Each firm has
unit costs of production, c1 = c2 = 0, which do not include the costs of the advertising.  α  is the cost
of advertising, whether that advertising is generic or branded.  If a firm chooses to advertise, it pays
α Bi.  If generic advertising exists, each firm pays a proportionate share of the cost, φ iα G, where φ 1
+ φ 2 = 1.   Firm profits are given by,
(2) Π
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where ki = ki(κ 0i, Bi, G); i, j = 1, 2 and i ≠  j.
I consider two scenarios showing how generic advertising may affect product
differentiation.  The first scenario is the one that is used to justify generic promotion programs, that
is, that generic advertising is a “rising tide” increasing demand for both goods in the same
proportion.  As will be shown below, under scenario 1, generic advertising increases demand by
increasing the consumers’ perceptions of product quality at the same rate in consumers’ utility5
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Because consumer preferences are uniformly distributed from lowest to highest between
zero and one, and each consumer buys at most one of the goods, demand for each good is simply
the density of consumer preferences in one of the segments along the unit interval multiplied by the
total number of consumers in the industry, N.  Specifically, the demands for goods 1 and 2 are
Q1(P1,P2, k1, k2) = (1 - θ 12)N and Q2(P1, ,P2, k1, k2) = (θ 12 - θ 02)N, respectively.
N ≡  N(G) is a function of generic advertising and is increasing at a constant or decreasing
rate.  To simplify the model, N is not a function of branded advertising.  In this way, generic
advertising acts to bring in new consumers, but branded advertising just affects market share. The
preference level of the consumer indifferent between purchasing good 1 and good 2, θ 12, is found by









. To find the preference
level of the consumer who is indifferent between buying nothing and buying good 2, θ 02, I set the
indirect utility function when no good is purchased equal to the indirect utility function when good








Multiplying the preference shares for each of the goods by the total number of consumers in the
market, N, gives the demand for each good.
Firm behavior is represented as a three-stage game as follows.  In the first stage of the game,
generic advertising, G, is set by the marketing board.  In the second stage, each firm simultaneously6
decides how much branded advertising to spend.  Then, in the final stage, the firms compete
through price competition by simultaneously choosing their prices.
Solution to the three-stage game requires first solving the final stage of the game: the
competition in prices.  Differentiating equation (2) with respect to each firm's own price and setting
the first-order conditions equal to zero and simultaneously solving these expressions for prices as a





















.  Notice that perfect competition in the processing sector arises when
consumers no longer distinguish any difference between goods 1 and 2.
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Under scenario 1, the two qualities are directly affected by generic advertising at the same
rate.  It will be shown below that as G increases, the equilibrium levels of branded advertising do
not decline.  Thus, at the very least, the two equilibrium quality levels are increasing at the same
rate under scenario 1.  Whether revenue is increasing or decreasing in generic advertising under
scenario 2 depends on whether the increase in profits from N’s growth offsets the any decrease in
profits from a decline in differentiation.7
The next step is to solve the branded advertising subgame for the equilibrium levels of
branded advertising.  For simplicity, I assume that there is a minimum quality level that removes
firm 2’s incentive to brand advertise.  The reason can be seen in equation (4).  If the commodities
have some minimum grade or standard affecting their intrinsic qualities, then firm 2 will have no
incentive to advertise if this minimum standard of quality occurs somewhere in the quality range
that makes demand for both goods positive.   Given such a minimum quality level results in a Nash
equilibrium whereby firm 1 advertises and firm 2 does not (contact the author for proof).  Finding
the optimal level of branded advertising for firm 1, then, results from optimizing firm 1’s second-
stage profit function, alone. Before proceeding, though, I shall derive the comparative static for the
effect of generic advertising on branded advertising.
Proceeding with the comparative static derivation, I shall write equation (3) as
(5) Π * ( ,) , () ()
11 1 2 1 =   ⋅− ⋅ + ⋅   fk BGk G N G B G αφ.
Differentiating equation (5) with respect to B1 gives the first-order condition for profit-
maximization
2.  It can be shown that an optimum does exist for and I denote the optimal value of
branded advertising as  BB G
** ()




















Differentiating this identity with respect to G, using the previous assumption that the function k1 is
additively separable in advertising, suppressing arguments, and re-arranging terms gives the
comparative static expression for the effect on firm 1’s branded advertising with respect to generic
advertising:
                                                          
2 I make one assumption about firm 1’s quality function.  Since either branded advertising or generic advertising or both
influence perceived quality, the absence of one should not affect the other.  Thus, I assume that firm 1’s quality is


















































































































































.  Note that Φ  ≥  0











 depending on the scenario of interest.  Noting that the denominator
in equation (7) is negative, the comparative static is strictly positive: an increase in generic
advertising results in an increase in firm 1’s branded advertising campaign.  Interestingly, this
positive relationship occurs regardless of which scenario holds.
Under scenario 1, this comparative static suggests that firm 1 capitalizes on the generic
advertising.  Intuitively, generic advertising is increasing the size of the market by increasing N and
by lowering the indifference parameter, θ 02.  Since firm 1 pays only a proportionate share of the
cost of this market increase, the cost of influencing a new consumer through the use of a branded
advertisement has declined.  Because, under scenario 1, an increase in firm 1’s branded advertising
helps both firms, generic advertising has the unusual result of increasing product differentiation
through its effect on firm 1’s branded campaign.
Further, Φ  is larger under scenario 2 than under scenario 1.  Therefore, if generic advertising
does increase good 2’s perceived quality more than good 1’s (i.e., if as G increases, the two goods
lose their differentiation), firm 1 will respond by increasing expenditures on its own branded
advertising–even more so than under the first scenario.  Firm 1 still capitalizes on the overall9
increase in both goods’ perceived qualities from generic advertising, but, under scenario 2, firm 1
must do even more branded advertising to keep product differentiation from declining.  Here,
generic advertising does hamper firm 1’s attempt to keep its differentiation.  In the simulations that
follow, I will provide an example showing that the benefit to firm 1 from an increase in perceived
quality can be outweighed by the loss in product differentiation.
Solving for the optimal level of branded advertising for firm 1 requires specifying functional
forms for the perceived quality variables and N. For this stage, I chose the following simple
functional forms:kB G
i i bi i gi =+ + κκ κ
0  ( i = 1, 2 and B2 = 0) and NG
g =+ ρρ
0
Some remarks should be made concerning the quality specification.  ki is what I have been
referring to as the perceived quality of the good.  For simplicity, I assume that all consumers
perceive the quality in the same way.  The first term in ki represents the intrinsic quality of the
goods such that κ 01 is greater than κ 02.  If the coefficients on the advertising variables are zero, then
consumers do not believe that advertising adds anything to the quality of the goods and perceived
quality is equal to intrinsic quality.  Under scenario 1, if generic advertising causes the perceived
quality of both goods to increase at the same rate, then κ g1 is equal to κ g2; whereas, κ g1 is less than
κ g2 if generic promotion increases the perceived quality of good 2 more than good 1 (scenario 2).
Substituting ki and N into equation (3), and solving the first-order condition for B1 gives the
equilibrium, branded-advertising level for firm 1 as a function of generic advertising and the other
exogenous parameters in the model.  Unfortunately, because of the nonlinearities in equation (3),
analytical solutions proved intractable for even the simplest specifications.  Because of this, the
optimal level of branded advertising was solved for numerically.10









, an optimum exists.  For the
numerical derivation, the intrinsic qualities of the goods were chosen so that in the absence of
advertising, good 1 would be preferred to good 2: κ 01 = 1000, κ 02 = 900.  The other terms were
chosen as follows: κ b1 = 10, ρ 0 = 100 (i.e., in the absence of advertising, there are 100 consumers),









 for G equal to ten. Using the above parameter values, the result is 275, so α  was set
above this number at 285.  Again, this ensures that if a solution is found, it will be the solution that
satisfies firm 1’s first-order condition for optimal branded advertising.  The above values remain the
same in both cases.
The coefficient values that change in the two scenarios are κ g1 and κ g2.  Under scenario 1,
κ g1 and κ g2 both equal ten.  Under scenario 2, κ g1 is unchanged, and κ g2 rises to forty.  The
numerical solutions to firm 1’s branded advertising choice for each scenario are quite lengthy and
may be obtained from the author.  Substituting these branded-advertising solutions into the profit
equations (3) and (4) gives the second-stage profit functions in terms of G and the exogenous
parameters.
In the simulations that follow, generic advertising will vary from zero to nine in order to
ensure that B1
* is optimal.  Again, the numbers chosen for the simulations mean very little in
themselves and were chosen simply to demonstrate what might happen if, under scenario 1, generic
advertising increased the quality of the two goods at the same rate, and, under scenario 2, if these
rates differed.  Nevertheless, the values are robust in the sense that they are derived from
theoretically viable first-order conditions.11
Figure 1 shows the results as expected from the discussion of the comparative static of
equation (7).  Under both scenarios, the optimal amount of branded advertising chosen by firm 1
increases as the level of generic advertising increases.  Further, firm 1’s level of branded advertising
is higher under scenario 2.  (The reader may verify that as G increases, so do k1 and k2 under both
scenarios.)  Figure 2 shows that under scenario 1, profits for both firms increase as generic
advertising increases.  This is as expected.  Under scenario 2, however, less generic advertising is
preferred to more by firm 1, while the converse holds for firm 2.  As figure 2 shows, an allocation
of nine units of generic advertising (the maximum in this example) by the marketing board is
preferred by the low-quality firm, whereas, the high-quality firm would prefer no generic
advertising.  Although these simulations represent just one possible outcome, they show that it is
possible for generic advertising to be detrimental to high-quality firms while being profitable to
firms producing lower qualities.
3.  Conclusion
This paper has shown that product heterogeneity is an important, but previously neglected,
component of commodity promotion research.  Incorporating product differentiation into a model of
generic commodity promotion shows that claims that generic promotion can help some growers
while hurting others are theoretically justified if the benefit to high-quality growers from increased
demand is outweighed by losses from lower differentiation.  This result has been overlooked in
other studies of commodity promotion showing positive benefits to all growers.
I have also performed an empirical test of this product-differentiation model using retail data
on U.S. dried prune consumption and advertising (Crespi, 1999).  The results indicate that, at least
in the case of dried prunes, the generic promotion campaign of the California Prune Board does not
lower the differentiation of competing brands, that is, the Prune Board’s advertising campaign fits
under scenario 1.  Further research into other commodities – especially those represented in the
Wileman case – is encouraged.12
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